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OVERVIEW
There is now a plethora of examples of economies that exhibit multiple equilibria.
These examples exist (even thrive) in almost all aspects of economics, including: stud-
ies of business cycles, growth theory, open economy macroeconomics, game theory,
income distribution, industrial organization, labor, etc. The popularity of this approach
indicates that the multiple equilibria perspective provides insights into a variety of
economic observations. In some cases, these models have been used, often informally,
as a basis for policy interventions.1
But, to many economists, model economies that exhibit multiple equilibria are
viewed as poorly suited for economic analysis. In particular, it is sometimes claimed
that these models have no testable implications and thus cannot be falsified.2 Further,
due to the multiplicity, they are supposedly not useful for comparative static exercises
that underlie policy analysis: with multiple equilibria, it is not clear how policy varia-
tions will affect outcomes, absent a selection mechanism.
For those economists who think that allowing multiplicity is a useful (essential)
way to confront reality, these arguments provide a challenging critique. For those
who want to dismiss the multiple equilibria perspective these are powerful arguments.
Either way, we ought to evaluate them. That is the purpose of this paper.
More precisely, the goal is to make progress on answering two questions that bear
on the ability of models with multiple equilibria to confront data:
1. Can a model with multiple equilibria be rejected?
2. Can the parameters of a model with multiple equilibria be identified?
While clearly related, these are intended to be two different questions.
The first takes as given a model economy with multiple equilibria and asks whether
there are observations that could falsify the model. Or, to the contrary, can “anything
happen” in a model with multiple equilibria in which actions are driven by unobserved
episodes of optimism and pessimism, so that this approach has “no empirical disci-
pline.” This is a delicate issue, since to some degree all models are false. Nonetheless,
there is a vague sense that models with multiple equilibria are more difficult to falsify.108 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
The second question considers a larger set of economies (that includes the model
with multiple equilibria) and asks whether the parameters of the model can be identi-
fied. Here we mean the parameters that describe preferences and technology as well
as those that govern the equilibrium beliefs of agents.3
The approach we take is to examine a series of examples from various branches of
economics.4 At one level, these examples indicate the usefulness of models of multiple
equilibria in an informal way: the researcher has some observations that motivate the
consideration of a model with multiple equilibria. But, our goal is to go further by
examining how these examples of multiple equilibria have been used to confront data.
We are therefore forced to address the issue of identification in model economies with
multiple equilibria.5
The first part of this essay provides a general framework for the discussion of
these issues.6 In addition, some abstract examples, drawing on Jovanovic [1989] and
Bryant [1983], are presented to fix ideas. In the second part of the essay, we examine
a variety of applications to understand better how researchers are coping with identi-
fication issues when evaluating models of multiple equilibria.7
ABSTRACT FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM
While many applications studied below are dynamic, the basic themes of this essay
can be adequately conveyed in a static formulation. We use this structure to discuss
multiple equilibria and then estimation.
Theory
Following Cooper and John [1988], consider a game played by a large number of
agents. Each agent chooses an action e from a compact, convex subset of ℜ. The payoff
of the agent is given by σ(e ,E; X, ) where E is, say, the average of the actions chosen
by other players in the game, X is the realized value of an exogenous variable that is
common to all agents, and  is a vector of parameters characterizing the payoffs of the
agent. Assume that σ(e, E; X, ) is continuously differentiable and strictly concave in
e. The agent’s optimization problem generates a unique optimal response given by
e = φ (E; X, ), a reaction function. This is shown in Figure 1.
Given that all agents have identical payoffs, we focus on the set of symmetric
Nash equilibria defined by ξ (X, ) = {e⏐e = φ (e; X, )}. Assume that ξ (X, ) is nonempty
for all values of (X, ).8
The equilibrium need not be unique. As argued in Cooper and John [1988], a
necessary condition for multiple symmetric Nash equilibria is strategic
complementarity: e = φ (E; X, ) is increasing in E.9 For the purposes of our discussion
here, the issue is not conditions for multiplicity per se but rather the implications of
multiplicity for the estimation of the parameter vector  and for evaluating how well
the model fits observations.
This quantitative analysis requires the specification of a mapping from the set of
equilibria into a time series (or panel) of outcomes. One common approach is to assume
the existence of a random variable (a sunspot), observed by all agents, which selects109 STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
from the set of Nash equilibria. This is often viewed as extrinsic uncertainty in that




Let Π(X, ) represent the set of probability distributions over the set of equilibria,
ξ (X, ). A sunspot process is given by a π ∈ Π such that π specifies the likelihood of
observing each equilibrium in ξ (X, ).10 Of course, this sunspots approach brings a lot
of “coordination” to a problem of coordination and is thus somewhat unappealing.
Instead, one might imagine a more elaborate process by which individual agents’
beliefs dictate their actions and those beliefs then evolve as a function of history.
Alternatively, as discussed in Jovanovic [1989], one might look more generally at the
restrictions imposed by the set of Nash equilibria without any selection from that set.
Estimation
Suppose a data set is generated by this “economy” consisting of D = (et, Xt) for t = 1,2,...T,
where et ∈ ξ (Xt,).11 The problem for the applied economist is to use D to infer some-
thing about both  and the sunspot process. Denote by + the expanded parameter set
that includes both the primitive parameters  and those that describe the sunspot
process.12 We discuss two approaches: method of moments and maximum likelihood.
Method of Moments. Let MT be a set of moments calculated from this data set.13
Further, let M(+) be a mapping from the parameters of the coordination game to a
set of moments calculated from a simulated data set that, like D, includes observa-
tions on equilibrium actions and the exogenous variables. We denote this data set,
contingent on + as {D(+)}. To create this simulated data set, imagine generating a
sequence of exogenous variables, X, and, for a given +, using these realizations to
generate a sequence of equilibrium actions, using a sunspot process to select from the
set of Nash equilibria if there are multiple equilibria. Calculating a set of moments
from this simulated data set creates M(+).
e
E
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Then one approach to estimation solves:
(1) min + (MT  – M(+))′W(MT – M(+)),
where W is a square weighting matrix and (MT – M(+)) is the difference between the
actual and the simulated moments. When the model is exactly identified (the number
of elements in θ+ equals the number of moments), then W is immaterial. But, if the
model is overidentified (the number of elements in + is less than the number of
moments), then the choice of W is important for efficiency.
This is a good point to be a bit more precise about the implications of identification
and multiplicity of equilibria. Suppose that M() is a one-to-one function: for each
value of , the model generates a unique set of moments and for each value of the
moments, there is only one value of  that could generate that value.14 In that case,
there is clearly only one value of  that could generate the observed moments. Clearly,
the minimization problem in Equation (1) produces a consistent estimate of .15 This
case is illustrated in Figure 2.16
FIGURE 2
Just Identification
The problem of identification arises when there are multiple values of  that can
match the observed moments. This is illustrated in Figure 3. Here the model is iden-
tified locally (there is not a problem of local flats) but there is no global identification.
In other cases (an example is given below), the identification problem may be local.
In the case of multiple equilibria: for a given , there are multiple moments that
can be generated.17 So, M() is not a function. This possibility is shown in Figure 4.
This implication of multiple equilibria is logically distinct from the standard identifica-
tion problem. That is, there is no reason to think that multiplicity by itself implies an
identification problem. From Figure 4, given measurement of the moments, there is
only a single value of θ that can generate those statistics.
But, once the sunspot process is added to a model that exhibits multiple equilibria,
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since, by assumption, the realizations of this process are not observed by the researcher.
In some applications, such as the stochastic growth model, there is a problem distin-
guishing productivity shocks from the effects of sunspots. Importantly, the magnitude
of this identification problem depends, among other things, on the moments selected.
Though the underlying sunspot may not be observed by the econometrician, varia-
tions in the transition matrix may have observable implications and thus the sunspot
process may be identified. Still, a key issue throughout this literature is the discrimi-
nation between two sources of variations in observable economic variables: sunspots
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Maximum Likelihood. A second approach is to consider the estimation of param-
eters through a maximum likelihood procedure.18 In the usual case of a linear regres-
sion model, y = Xβ + ε, we make an assumption about the distribution of the errors.19
We then express the likelihood of the data as a function of the parameters (β) of the
model and proceed to the maximization of the likelihood function.
In the presence of multiple equilibria, maximizing a likelihood function is not as
easy.20 First, economies that generate multiple equilibria are inherently nonlinear so
that simple linear representations may be inadequate. Second, the sunspot variables
reappear as a type of latent variable, observable to private agents but not to the
researcher.
Suppose we have the data set D and wish to write down the likelihood of an
observation for a particular year, (et, Xt).21 Partition Xt into two components,  XX tt
12 , ()
and assume that while Xt is observed by private agents, only Xt
1 is observable to the
researcher. So, Xt
2 plays the role of the error term in the linear regression. Then, the
likelihood of observing (et,Xt
1) is:




tt   + () = () +− () () ,, , .
11 1 1
Here, q represents the probability of the pessimistic sunspot (superscript P) variable
and (1 – q) is the probability of optimism (superscript O). For each realization of the
sunspot variable, there is a distinct piece of the likelihood function.22 Effectively, these
branches of the likelihood function calculate the probability of observing (et, Xt
1) con-
ditional on the sunspot variable.
The likelihood function thus integrates over the two random variables not observed
by the researcher. The first is the sunspot variable. The second is Xt
2, the part of Xt
that only agents observe. Thus, LeX
j
tt  , 1 () , for j = O,P, is the probability of Xt
2 taking
a value so that we would observe (et, Xt
1), given that the sunspot takes value j.
With this construction, the likelihood of the entire sample is then





  + () = () +− () () () ∏ ,, . 11 1
Maximization of this likelihood will lead to estimates of the underlying parameters of
the payoff functions as well as to estimates of q. Essentially, the probability of the
optimistic sunspot variable is determined by the likelihood function putting weight on
each of two regimes (optimism and pessimism) so as to maximize the likelihood of
observing D.
TWO GAMES WITH COMPLEMENTARITIES
Here we illustrate these issues by building upon examples from Jovanovic [1989]
and Bryant [1983]. These examples are useful for highlighting the main points we
have made, though these games are too abstract to be taken to the data.113 STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
A Participation Game
As in Jovanovic [1989], consider a game played by two agents, i = 1, 2. Each agent
can choose to participate in an activity: xi = 1 indicates participation by agent i and xi = 0
means no participation. If the agent chooses not to participate, then agent i receives a
payoff of zero: σi = 0. If agent i chooses to participate, then the payoff is given by
(4) σi = λx–i – µ,
where x–i is the action taken by the other agent. Here λ is a parameter that we are
seeking to estimate and µ is a random shock to the value of participation (assume that
it is a common shock). Suppose that µ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] so there are no
parameters of this distribution to estimate. If λ is positive, the model exhibits a strate-
gic complementarity: the value of participating is higher if the other agent participates.
In fact, this complementarity is sufficiently strong that it is always an equilibrium
for neither agent to participate. That is, if x–i = 0, then the best response of agent i is
to set xi = 0 as well, regardless of the realized value of µ.
But, for some values of  µ, there is also an equilibrium with participation.23 In
particular, if λ ≥ µ, then x1 = x2 = 1 is a Nash equilibrium. Still, even when λ ≥ µ, the
equilibrium with x1 = x2 = 0 exists. The equilibrium in x1 = x2 = 1 clearly Pareto
dominates the one with x1 = x2 = 0. A coordination failure occurs when λ ≥ µ and the
equilibrium with x1 = x2 = 0 is observed. This is a form of social but not individual
inefficiency.
Suppose that a researcher observes a time series of actions chosen by the two
agents: D = (x1t, x2t) for t = 1, 2, 3, ...T .24 The goal of the researcher is to estimate the
single parameter that governs the interaction between the agents, λ. Knowing λ is
important for determining if there are coordination problems and also in designing
remedies. Can the researcher estimate λ?
Here the issue of equilibrium selection is important for identification. For example,
suppose that agents in this economy are very pessimistic about the participation of
the other agent. This pessimism leads them never to participate, regardless of the
realization of µ. In this Nash equilibrium, the time series of participation decisions
will clearly not be informative about λ: identification is not possible.
Alternatively, suppose that agents are optimistic so that in the event of multiple
equilibria agents participate. In this Nash equilibrium, x1 = x2 = 1 will be observed
whenever λ ≥ µ. The researcher will then observe a fraction of the time series in which
agents participate and a fraction in which they do not. Given the assumption that the
distribution of µ is uniform on [0, 1], the maximum likelihood estimate of λ will equal
the fraction of observations in which x1 = x2 = 1.
Finally, suppose that if there are multiple equilibria (λ ≥ µ) then agents will par-
ticipate with probability q. Then observed participation rates yield an estimate of the
product qλ but not the individual terms. Nonetheless, in this case the researcher can
determine whether a complementarity is present and thus whether there is a poten-
tial for coordination failure.114 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
An Effort Game
A second example draws upon the effort game presented in Bryant [1983]. This
example, with a continuum of symmetric Nash equilibria, illustrates the severity of
the identification problem.
Suppose there are I agents each setting a level of effort (ei ∈ [0, 1]) for i = 1, 2, ...I
in the interval [0, 1]. Suppose that payoffs are given by:
(5) σ(ei, e–i) = amin(e) – ei,
where e is the vector of effort levels by the I agents so that min(e) is the lowest effort
level and a is a parameter. If a > 1, then there is a continuum of Nash equilibria
indexed by the level of effort in [0, 1]. Of course, ei = 1 for all i is the Pareto dominant
equilibrium and thus any effort level short of this is a coordination failure.
The issue, though, is what this model allows us to identify from observations.
Suppose that the researcher observes the average level of effort in this economy. In
equilibrium, of course, this average level is the same as the equilibrium level. Absent
a mechanism for selection, for a given value of a > 1, any level of activity could be an
equilibrium. Further, and more importantly for identification, the set of equilibria
does not vary with the parameter a, as long as it exceeds unity.
This example therefore illustrates a case in which the moment predicted by a
model may not even be locally unique: identification is not possible. Furthermore, the
model cannot be falsified in that any level of effort in [0, 1] can be observed in equilib-
rium. Note, though, that this example is special in that the multiplicity is extreme:
none of the equilibria are locally unique.
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION
To illustrate these issues in an explicit example that can be taken to the data, we
consider the economy explored in Cooper and Corbae [2002]. One point of that exer-
cise was to explore whether a model of multiple equilibria based upon a complementarity
in the intermediation process could match certain features of the Great Depression.
Here we focus on a simple parametric example taken from that paper.
The Cooper and Corbae [2002] overlapping-generations economy had a number of
key ingredients:
• Heterogeneous households that lived for two periods; working in youth and
consuming in both youth and old age;
• Two stores of value: money and “bank” deposits;
• Intermediaries with fixed costs of operation that are borne by the agents join-
ing the intermediary; and
• Firms that hire workers using funds borrowed from the intermediary.
The key to the multiplicity of equilibria is the endogenous market participation of
the households. In one equilibrium, many households participate in intermediated
activity thus increasing the returns to participation for all agents. In another equilib-
rium, many households hold money as a store of value. Consequently, the households115 STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
that do join the intermediary bear relatively large fixed participation costs. Cooper
and Corbae [2002] construct sunspot equilibria by randomizing across these two steady
states. They are able to match some of the prominent features of the Great Depres-
sion in their parameterized economy.
Households
The key to the model is the household’s choice between holding money and join-
ing the intermediary. Due to the presence of the fixed cost of operation, the return to
joining the intermediary is an increasing function of the number of other agents in
this coalition. As in Bryant [1987] and Weil [1987], there is a complementarity in the
intermediation process. This complementarity can generate multiple equilibria: if many
(few) agents join the intermediary then the fixed costs borne by each household are
relatively low (high) and thus (not) joining the intermediary is optimal.
A household of generation t has preferences given by:
(6) ln ln . cn Ec t
t
tt t











This decision is independent of any intertemporal rates of return reflecting the speci-
fication of preferences in this example.
Given a real wage (wt) and real return on savings (rt), households choose either to
hold money as a store of value or join an intermediary. If a household joins the inter-
mediation coalition, they incur a fixed cost of τ and earn a marginal of rt. The loan
supply for this household is:
(8) lw tt t =− () + () +
+ () βα τ β φ
γγ 1
1 ,
where φ = βγ / [(1 + β)(1 + γ)] and α is the endowment. If a household holds money, then
labor supply is again given by Equation (7) and money demand is:
(9) mw tt =+ () +
+ () βα β φ
γγ 1
1 .
Cooper and Corbae [2002] assume three types of households. Let type i have endow-
ment level αi and let Ai be the fraction of this type where α1 < α2 < α3. Let Hi be the
fraction of households with endowment level equal to or bigger than αi and let µ(αi) be
the mean endowment level for these households. Estimation of this simple income
distribution is an important element in matching observations of the Great Depression.
Firms
Firms have access to a production technology that converts labor input in period t
into period t + 1 output. Assume that the production function for a representative firm
is f(n) = ψnξ so that labor demand is116 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
(10) nw r t
d







Note that labor demand depends on the interest rate as firms must borrow to finance
their wage payments.
Cooper and Corbae [2002] assume two types of firms: type j has fixed costs of
production kj, and Fj is the fraction of firms with costs equal to or less than kj, where
k1 < k2. As firms borrow to finance wage payments, their loan demand is wn tt
d.
Multiple Steady States and Sunspots
A steady state equilibrium is characterized by a wage rate, an interest rate, and a
price level such that all agents (households and firms) behave optimally and all mar-
kets clear. For this example, there may be multiple steady states. The first is an
optimistic equilibrium: type 1 households hold money while types 2 and 3 join the
intermediary and all firms produce. The second is a pessimistic equilibrium: only type
3 households join the intermediary and only type 1 firms produce.
A stationary sunspot equilibrium indexes all the equilibrium prices and quantities
by an extrinsic (sunspot) variable (θ) that determines which of the equilibria will arise
in a given period. Cooper and Corbae [2002] argue that their model has two steady
states. Given this, they construct a two-state sunspot equilibrium in which the states
are denoted optimism (θ = θo) and pessimism (θ = θp). Let the sunspot variable follow
a first order Markov process and let Π be a 2x2 transition matrix for θ. An element of
Π is given by:
(11) ∏() == = () + ij tj t i ,P r . θθ θ θ 1
We first discuss the set of steady states and then consider sunspots. For the economy
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From these expressions, an equilibrium with high household participation at inter-
mediaries (optimism) will imply, from Equation (12), low interest rates because the
fraction of agents participating in loan activity (Hα* ) and the flow of loans (µ(α*)) will
both be large. The effect on interest rates may be offset by higher firm participation
(Fk*). From Equation (13), wages will rise from the increased labor demand induced by
the fall in interest rates and higher firm participation.117 STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
To guarantee that these conjectured asset market participation patterns are opti-
mal requires a check on the participation decisions of the different households and
firms. The expressions for interest rates and wages can be used to solve for the equi-
librium choices of households and hence their expected lifetime utility. Recall that
∆(θ) is the difference in utility between making loans and holding money. For this
example,
(14) ∆ θβ τ θ α ω θ β θ () =+ ()− () + () () [] {} ++ () () 11 1 ln ln , r
where ω(θ) = [γ/(1 + γ)]w(θ)(1 + γ)/γ and τ(θ) = Γ/Hα* (θ). From Equation (14), we see the
cutoff property for asset market participation: given (w(θ), r(θ), τ(θ)), only agents with
sufficiently large endowments will join the intermediary since the utility differential
is increasing in α.
The optimistic equilibrium with household types 2 and 3 joining the intermediary
coalition arises if Equation (14) is positive for endowment levels α2 and α3. This condi-
tion is evaluated with τ = Γ/Hα2, using Hα2 and µ( α2) to determine interest rates and
wages. In an optimistic equilibrium, we must also check that both firm types make
positive profits. Similarly, the conditions for the pessimistic equilibrium can be checked
as well.
If these conditions hold, then the economy displays multiple steady states, indexed
by θ. In effect, the multiple steady states correspond to a particular sunspot transition
matrix, Π, with ones on the diagonal. But, there are generally other sunspot equilib-
ria in the neighborhood of this extreme transition matrix.25 With the preferences
assumed in the example, introducing sunspots will only influence the asset market
participation decisions. In each of the steady states constructed above, all of the asset
market participation decisions were strict inequalities. Therefore, a Π matrix with
elements near one on the diagonal will not change these decisions either.
It is easy, therefore, to construct sunspot equilibria in the neighborhood of these
two steady states. Let ∏oo and ∏ pp denote two critical transition probabilities. Then
by the arguments above (formalized in Cooper and Corbae [2002], there will exist
sunspot equilibria for any Π as long as Πoo ≥ ∏oo and Πpp ≥ ∏ pp.
Of course, these equilibria depend on the parameters of preferences, technology
and the sunspot process. We turn to estimation now.
Parameterization
Let + be the list of parameters that include:
• Household parameters: (γ, β);
• Wealth distribution;
• Firm’s parameters: (ξ, ψ);
• Distribution of firm’s fixed costs;
• Fixed cost of intermediation: Γ; and
• The transition matrix for the sunspot variable, Π.
The value of + is chosen to minimize the distance between actual and simulated
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Cooper and Corbae [2002] only estimated the household income distribution and the
verification costs, as these were key to the multiplicity of equilibria. Of course, in
principle, the estimation could have been broadened to estimate more parameters
and more moments.26
Cooper and Corbae [2002] assume that the U.S. was in an optimistic equilibrium
pre-1929 and then was in a pessimistic equilibrium over the 1930-33 period. This is
necessary for the calibration since the only source of fluctuations is in the sunspot
process. So, the estimation essentially chooses parameters to match moments for the
two steady states outlined above.27 In each case, the participation decisions are checked
to guarantee that the multiplicity exists for the particular parameterization.
The moments chosen, under optimism and pessimism, were: real interest rates,
currency/deposit ratios, deflation, output growth, and velocity growth. These moments
were selected for their salience in the ongoing discussion over the Great Depression.28
Tables 1 and 2 present the predictions of this economy, based upon the estimated
(household income distribution) and calibrated (all others) parameter values given
there. Cooper and Corbae [2002] compare steady states of the model against observa-
tions before (optimism) and during (pessimism) the Great Depression.29
TABLE 1
Steady State Values
Variable Optimism (model, data) Pessimism (model, data)
Real interest rate % (8.6, 7.4) (10.1, 11.3)
Currency/deposit (0.079, 0.086) (0.233, 0.227)
Parameters: Γ = 0.0055, [k1 = 0, k2 = 0.06], F1 = 0.95, γ = 0.05, [α1 = 0.23, α2 = 0.25, α3 = 12], [A1 = 0.36,
A2 = 0.55], β = 0.9, ξ = 0.9, φ = 1.11.
TABLE 2






Real wages (–0.6, –9)
From Table 1, the estimated model is able to match movements in the currency/
deposit ratio. The ratio is higher in the pessimistic steady state, rising from 0.079 to
0.233, while rising from 0.086 to 0.227 in U.S. data. The interest rate on loans rises
from 8.6 to 10.1 percent, while in U.S. data the real ex post return on short term
government debt increased from 7.4 percent in 1929 to 11.3 percent. The model is
unable to match the movements in the loan/deposit ratio principally because our banks
have no other assets to hold.
From Table 2:
• Real output does not fall as much in the model as it does during the Great
Depression. This reflects the absence of other factors, such as real investment
and inventory changes, that may have magnified these effects.119 STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
• Consequently, the model predicts too much deflation relative to observation.
• The model predicts a fall in loans relative to output but not in the loan/output
ratio. This is consistent with observations.
• Given that labor supply is so flat, wages do not vary much.
One very interesting element in the example is that the fixed cost is only about 1
percent of deposits. Still, this small fixed cost can produce multiple equilibria due to
the swing in the middle class, whose asset holdings change across the two steady
states.
In a sunspot equilibrium constructed by randomizing in the neighborhood of the
two steady states, the movements of the variables across the states are given in Tables
1 and 2. Subject to there being a sunspot equilibrium, labor supply and savings deci-
sions, given the special preferences assumed in this example, are independent of the
sunspot process.
In fact, one can calculate how much persistence in each state is necessary to have
a sunspot equilibrium. This is of interest since one suspects that pessimism is not
close to a permanent state. For our example, we can support a sunspot equilibrium in
which Πoo ≥ 0.99, while Πpp ≥ 0.5. The pessimistic state, therefore, need not be very
persistent, though the optimistic state is fairly persistent, and so switches to pessi-
mism (such as a Great Depression episode) are relatively infrequent.
So, returning to the theme of this paper, is this an example of success in the
“estimation” of a model built upon multiple equilibria? At one level, it certainly is
since the mapping from parameters to observations (simple moments) allowed us to
determine some of the key parameters of interest. That is, the moments reported in
Table 1 were sufficient to pin down values of the underlying parameters.
However, there are parameters that Cooper and Corbae [2002] did not estimate.
But there is nothing in the procedure per se that limits the estimation in that way. All
that is required is the inclusion of additional moments along with a demonstration
that these moments can identify the structural parameters. The multiplicity of equi-
libria does not alter the essentials of the simulated method of moments approach.
In terms of falsification, the model is (informally) quite far from observation: we
would reject the overidentified model. The model also does not allow any fluctuations
conditional on a regime and hence is clearly at odds with observations on that basis. In
this sense, it is clearly not the case that a model with multiple equilibria can not be
rejected. In fact, to take the model more seriously to the data (that is, to match more
moments or to pursue maximum likelihood estimation) one would need to include
other sources of fluctuations, such as productivity shocks.
On the key issue of identification, note that in fact Cooper and Corbae [2002] were
unable to go beyond restricting the sunspot process to an interval. Again, it appears
that this is a consequence of the functional forms they choose in the analysis, since
real decisions on labor supply and savings appear to be insensitive to real returns. So,
perhaps in a model with richer preferences, the sunspot process could be more pre-
cisely estimated from observations on consumption, employment, and even asset prices.
A final point concerns a competing model. It might be possible to construct a
model that has a unique equilibrium with fluctuations driven by real shocks to a
banking technology. That model may appear to be observationally equivalent to the120 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
one constructed by Cooper and Corbae [2002]. Yet, at least informally, the response of
the economy to confidence-building measures by the Roosevelt Administration in the
mid 1930s lends some additional support in favor of the sunspot perspective.
AGGREGATE FLUCTUATIONS WITH TECHNOLOGICAL
COMPLEMENTARITIES
Similar issues of identification arise in stochastic business cycle models in the
presence of technological complementarities, see Bryant [1983], Benhabib and Farmer
[1994], Baxter and King [1991] and Cooper [1999]. In these models, the production
function for a representative firm includes some measure of aggregate production.
The idea is to introduce a complementarity into the production process so that high
levels of activity in other firms implies that a single firm is more productive as well.30
Let y represent the output at a given firm, Y be average output, and k and n the firm’s
input of capital and labor, respectively. Consider a production function of:
(15) y = AkαnφYγ,
where A is a productivity shock that is common across producers. Here γ  parameter-
izes the interaction between producers. If γ  is positive, then there is a complementarity
at work: as other agents produce more, the productivity of the individual agent increases
as well. This production function can be imbedded into a stochastic growth model.
Consider the problem of a representative household with access to a production tech-
nology given by Equation (15). As all agents are identical and all shocks are common,
the representative household will accumulate its own capital, supply its own labor,
and interact with other agents only due to the technological complementarity. Thus
the household solves:










(17) lt + nt = 1,
(18) ct + it = yt,
(19) kt + 1 = kt(1 – δ) + it, and
(20) yA k nY tt t t =
− αα γ 1 .
In this optimization problem, the individual household takes Yt as given. In a
symmetric equilibrium, yt = Yt. As in Baxter and King [1991], this equilibrium condi-
tion is neatly imposed through the first-order conditions when the marginal products
of labor and capital are calculated. From the set of first-order conditions, the symmet-
ric equilibrium can be analyzed through by approximation around a steady state.31
The feature of this economy that distinguishes it from the traditional RBC model
is the presence of the technological complementarity, γ. We focus our discussion on
estimating this parameter either directly by estimation of Equation (15) or by infer-
ring it from the equilibrium.32121 STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
Production Function Estimation
Cooper and Haltiwanger [1996] discuss evidence on estimates of γ from a variety of
sources. Cooper and Johri [1997] provide estimates of both contemporaneous and dynamic
production complementarities.
A key element in this exercise is, of course, identification. In particular, how can
a researcher distinguish variations in output and productivity that arise from a com-
mon shock from those that arise endogenously through the production
complementarity? The key is to find variables that are independent of the technology
shocks (A) but are correlated with output movements. Naturally, one turns to policy
interventions for this purpose.
In equilibrium, there is an identification problem that can be seen directly from
Equation (15). Imposing yt = Yt and taking logs, Equation (15) becomes:
(21) ln ln ln ln . yA n k tt t t =− () [] +− () [] − () [] 11 1 γαγ φ γ
Clearly, there is no way to identify the three parameters characterizing the technol-
ogy from the two regression coefficients.
Baxter and King [1991] estimate γ  by imposing constant returns to scale α + φ = 1.
Using demand side instruments, they estimate γ of about .33.
Cooper and Johri [1997] estimate a version of Equation (21) that includes both
contemporaneous and dynamic interactions in the production function. Their data is a
panel at the two-digit level and they exploit sectoral variation in their estimation.
They use monetary innovations as instruments and find evidence of both contempora-
neous and dynamic complementarities. In particular, when constant returns to scale
to own inputs is imposed, Cooper and Johri [1997] estimate γ = .24 and a dynamic
complementarity of .32.
Equilibrium Analysis
Instead of focusing on the production function parameters alone, one can instead
estimate parameters through the equilibrium of the model, as in Farmer and Guo
[1995]. In some cases, the production complementarity can be large enough that mul-
tiple equilibria arise, as described in Benhabib and Farmer [1994] and Farmer and
Guo [1994].33 Here multiplicity arises in the form of multiple paths converging to a
locally stable steady state rather than multiple steady states. Given this indetermi-
nacy, sunspots can be used to select the transition path. These economies are of
interest as well since they illustrate the estimation of a dynamic sunspot equilibrium.
The economy studied by Farmer and Guo [1995] adds taste shocks to the optimiza-
tion problem of the individual household in Equation (16). The model thus contains
two types of fundamental shocks (tastes and technology), as well as sunspots (effec-
tively Euler equation errors). They reduce the equilibrium analysis to a system of
stochastic difference equations and then estimate these using instrumental variables.
Farmer and Guo [1995] find:
• Support for the conditions for sunspot equilibria: the labor demand curve is
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• Euler equation (demand) shocks are important; and
• Parameter estimates: increasing returns to scale in labor alone, although the
private return is not estimated.
These results seem quite favorable to the sunspots approach. But a couple of points of
caution are in order.
First, the model is estimated with errors to the Euler equation. While one inter-
pretation of these errors has to do with the existence of a sunspot equilibrium, Farmer
and Guo [1995] are appropriately cautious at this point. This shock could, in fact,
reflect a number of sources of variation that are included in their structural model,
such as variations in government spending and shocks to the intermediation pro-
cess.34 There is a difficult identification problem, therefore, that remains in order to
complete the argument that fluctuations are driven by confidence alone.
Second, the results on the relative slopes of labor supply (negative) and labor
demand (positive) are, to say the least, rather unorthodox. The positively sloped labor
demand reflects increasing returns at the social level.35 Clearly, further evaluation of
these results, relative to those found in the labor literature, seems in order.
WAGE INEQUALITY AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
Labor economics must confront the observation of wage inequality. In the U.S.,
considerable research effort is dedicated to understanding the earnings inequality
between blacks and whites. The possibility, raised in the theoretical work on signal-
ing, is that the wage inequality, as well as other differences in labor market experi-
ence, may reflect the multiplicity of equilibria rather than fundamental differences
between groups.
To see how this may happen, we discuss informally the equilibria outlined in
Coate and Loury [1993]. Suppose that firms have to assign workers to either a simple
or a complex task. Workers prefer to be assigned to the complex task (perhaps reflect-
ing higher wages or more prestige). Firms want to assign only qualified workers to
the complex task. Workers become qualified for the complex task by becoming edu-
cated (working hard at school), though at a cost that is distributed across the workers
(a proxy for ability). The problem is that firms are unable to observe the education of
the workers. Instead, they observe a noisy signal of worker qualification. As underly-
ing worker quality is not observable, differences in wages and job assignments will
reflect the market’s perception of the average ability of workers, given education
attainment.
It is then possible to construct equilibria in which workers from one group (call it
group A) invest less than workers from another group (B) simply because the per-
ceived returns to education are lower for group A workers. Given this choice by a
worker in group A, a firm will assign that worker to the complex task if that worker
“scores” higher on a test of qualification than a worker from group B. So, in equilib-
rium, the returns to education are indeed lower for group A than for group B. Essen-
tially, the fact that few workers in group A decide to acquire human capital pulls down
the return to that investment: a firm will interpret a good signal as luck rather than
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These models of job assignment (and even ones with more elaborate structures
for wage determination) can have multiple equilibria. In fact, there is a close link
between discrimination and multiplicity brought out in this discussion. If there is
discrimination in the sense that otherwise identical groups are treated differently in
equilibrium, then there must be multiple equilibria. In the example above, assuming
that the fundamentals of the two groups are the same, one could simply switch the
labels of the two groups and thus construct an equilibrium in which the returns to
education are lower for group B than for group A.36
An interesting research question, therefore, is whether observed time series varia-
tion in the black-white wage gap in the U.S. may reflect movements across equilibria
rather than changes in fundamentals. Moro [2003] addresses this question.
Model
Here we outline the model used by Moro [2003] and then turn to its empirical
implementation given the possibility of multiple equilibria.37
Workers. There are two groups of workers that are identical except for a (payoff
irrelevant) label. For concreteness we call them black and white workers since the
empirical evidence is about this form of wage inequality. Workers can either invest in
human capital (train) or not. Investment is costly (c) and this cost is distributed across
the workers. Further, workers differ in underlying ability. These differences in ability
and the cost of investment in human capital are not independent: the cost of training
is lower for high-ability workers. Workers care about the returns to their labor (the
wage) less the cost of training. The wage, as discussed below, reflects this signal of
ability. The key to motivating a worker to train, therefore, is the differential between
the wages received in the tasks they may be assigned to.
After making a training decision, workers are tested. These test scores are observ-
able to the firms and along with the workers’ group identity are used to determine
wages and task assignment.
Firms. There are many firms in the market. They hire workers and assign them
to tasks. Like the Coate and Loury [1993] model, there are two tasks. The first (simple
job) does not require any training. The second (complex job) does require training.
Firms are unable to observe the ability of workers and are also unable to observe the
training of workers. Instead, they observe a signal that reflects the workers’ training:
a worker who trains is more likely to obtain a higher signal. This signal is used by
firms to set wages and to determine the task of the worker.
Equilibrium. Firms hold certain beliefs about the workers and use them to assign
workers to tasks and to pay them. The labor market is assumed to be competitive so
that wages in the two tasks equal expected marginal products, conditional on both the
signal and the worker type. The equilibrium revolves around the determination of a
critical test score that determines the assignment of a worker. If a worker scores in
excess of this critical score, then he/she is assigned to the complex task. Otherwise,
the worker is assigned to the simple task.124 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
As in the simpler model of Coate and Loury [1993], the key to the multiplicity of
equilibria are the implications of prior beliefs for firms’ decisions on assignment of
workers. If firms believe that the fraction of workers who are training is low, then
workers will not perceive any gains to training: good test results will rationally be
viewed as good luck.38
Estimation
Moro [2003] estimates the model using cross-sectional data on wages of black and
white workers.39 The key to the estimation is the mapping from the structural param-
eters to wage distributions. Then, having observations of wages, the parameters can
be estimated.
In a first stage, Moro [2003] estimates the parameters of the testing technology,
the cutoffs on the tests, and the prior beliefs of firms about the fraction of qualified
workers in each group from observations on wage data. He finds (in each of the three
cross sections of data) that:
• The fraction of blacks investing is less than that of whites;
• The threshold signal for blacks exceeds that for whites; and
• The model captures the relative wage distributions quite well.
Given these estimates, the second stage estimates the distribution of training
costs across the workers as well as the distributions of skills in the two groups. Essen-
tially the identification here is achieved by equilibrium restrictions: construct the
distribution of costs such that the observations are part of an equilibrium.
Moro [2003] then searches for other equilibria. He concludes that there were
multiple equilibria in one of the three years but that the economy selected the equilib-
rium with lowest differentials in wages and investment.
This is a very different approach to studying multiple equilibria. Effectively, Moro
[2003] estimates a model assuming that the outcome is from a particular equilibrium
and then, through functional forms, searches for other equilibria. One concern with
this approach stems from considering this procedure in a setting where there are
indeed multiple equilibria. How can we guarantee that an adequate approximation
around one of them (assume it is linear!) will necessary find other equilibria?
SOCIAL INTERACTIONS
The complementarities that underlie the basic model of Cooper and John [1988]
also appear in a growing literature on social interactions. The basic idea is that each
agent has a reference group (for example, a neighborhood, a peer group) that influ-
ences his or her behavior. For example, the agent may desire to “conform” to the
behavior of others and thus will tend to mimic their actions. This creates a strategic
complementarity: a single agent has an incentive to mimic the actions of others.40
Here, though, the strategic complementarity is associated with an interaction in pref-
erences rather than in technology [Bryant 1983] or trading opportunities [Diamond
1982].
Empirically, there is evidence of correlated behavior across groups of agents. The
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common variations or some form of social interaction. This section begins with a
review of a basic model and then turns to estimation.
As Manski states: “This paper examines the ‘reflection’ problem that arises when
a researcher observing the distribution of behavior in a population tries to infer whether
the average behavior in some group influences the behavior of the individuals that
comprise the group” [1993, 532].
Manski’s Model
Suppose that individual behavior is given by:
(22) yE y x z =+ () + ′ + αβ ηµ ,
where the y denotes an outcome of individual choice (school achievement), x is attributes
of an individual’s reference group (school peer group), and z and µ are individual attributes,
where z is observed and µ is not observed by the researcher.
The individual behavior depends on the group through the term E(y | x).41 Thus a
key parameter is β. The determination of the individual choice is part of a social
equilibrium as long as β ≠ 0. To solve for the average level of performance given (x, z),
use Equation (22) to obtain:
(23) Ey xz Ey x z ,. () =+ () + ′ αβ η
Integrating this over z, the source of variation across individuals, yields:
(24) Ey x Ey x Ezx () =+ () + ′ () αβ η .
Given the assumed linearity in Equation (22), as long as β ≠ 1, there is a unique
equilibrium of:
(25) Ey x Ezx () =− () + ′ () − () [] αβ ηβ 11 .
This expression can then be used in Equation (22), yielding:
(26) yE z x z =− () + ′ () − () [] + ′ + α β βη β η µ 11 .
The social interaction is parameterized by β, which determines the response of the
individual to variations in the mean behavior of the reference group. But, a regression
based upon this equilibrium will not necessarily determine all of the parameters
uniquely: there is potentially an identification problem.42
The intuition parallels that given in the discussion of Equation (21). In that case,
the own returns to factor input were impossible to distinguish from production func-
tion interactions given aggregate observations. Here, we see that, given observations
on group and not individual decisions, disentangling social interactions from the
individual’s response to common sources of variation is not possible. In some cases,
though, observations on individual choices (again in parallel with the production func-
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Take, for example, the outcome of students in a high school. Suppose that the
average achievement of these students is quite high. Does this reflect the “productive
atmosphere” created by the interaction of these students or does it reflect “good luck”
of having a great teacher in common? What types of natural experiments and data
would allow us to identify the interactions?
Manski [1993] presents certain conditions under which identification is possible in
Eqaution (26). Clearly, if E(z′|x) and z are independent, then the two coefficients
obtained from Equation (26) will enable a researcher to distinguish β from η. Other-
wise, identification will not be possible. If E(z′|x) does not vary across the reference
groups, then this term is constant and β cannot be estimated even from a cross section
of individuals. To appreciate the importance of individual variations, suppose that
individuals in a reference group had the same value of z. Then again, it is not possible
to distinguish β from η.
Binary Choice: Brock and Durlauf
Brock and Durlauf [2000] study related models in which the binary choice of an
individual depends on the choices of others, as in the participation complementarities
in Cooper [1999]. Brock and Durlauf [2000] consider the binary choice model:
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where ωi is the choice of agent i, Zi is a vector of exogenous variables that influence
the preferences of the agent across the alternatives, µ ω i
e
i − ()  represents the beliefs of
the agent over the binary choices of others, and εi(ωi) is an agent/choice-specific shock.
The model of choice is therefore similar to the binary choice models found in
other parts of economics, with one additional feature: the returns to a particular
choice depend on the choices of others. Of course, in this general form the nature of
this interaction is not clear. A strategic complementarity is present if the likelihood
that an agent selects a particular action is higher if “others” select that same action.
By “others” we mean agents whose choices influence the payoffs to the agent whose
behavior we are studying. As in the discussion of Manksi’s model and in the discussion
of the production complementarity model, determining the appropriate reference group
is an important open issue in this literature.
Brock and Durlauf [2000] propose specification of utility as:
(28) Vu E iii
e
iii i i i i j i j
ji
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≠
() ( ) () () () − () + () =− ∑ 2
2
where Jij is a weight that agent i places on the (expected) choice of j. A simple model
would have Jij = J iff j is in i’s reference group. Then J would be added to the key
parameter in estimation of the social interactions effect.
Brock and Durlauf [2000] describe the estimation of this model once structure is
placed on the errors (for example, a logistic specification). Importantly, there is the
issue of the treatment of the expectations terms. One approach is to think of these as127 STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
additional regressors. A second approach, along the lines explored above, is to supple-
ment the model of choice with a rational expectations restriction on the expectations
of agent i. Brock and Durlauf [2000] follow this approach as well though they use the
variables that reflect the social interaction as regressors rather than solving for them
as part of an equilibrium.43
Not surprisingly, many of the same identification problems arise in the binary
choice framework as in Manski’s model. However, Brock and Durlauf [2000] argue
that variations in the equilibrium selected across “neighborhoods” can provide a basis
of identification.
CONCLUSION
This paper began with the often expressed concern that models built upon mul-
tiple equilibria, despite their intuitive appeal, were incapable of confronting data. The
point of this paper was to argue, through selected examples, that, in fact, progress has
been made to use observations to estimate (some) parameters of these models and to
falsify these models.
Note that the empirical approach described here rests upon versions of simulated
method of moments and/or maximum likelihood. This emphasis does not imply that
alternative means of model evaluation should not be considered. In addition, there
may be certain experiments initiated by government action (the introduction of deposit
insurance, aspects of the National Industrial Recovery Act, as in Cooper and
Haltiwanger [1993]) where the response of the economy reveals the resolution of
strategic uncertainty. Bringing these policy-induced regime changes into the estima-
tion exercise may be informative.
Of course, a paper of this type must miss some important aspects of the ongoing
research on this topic. The paper lacks any discussion of work on experimental coor-
dination games. In that research, the dynamics of learning through the interaction of
players is quite rich and may ultimately provide the basis for the empirical evaluation
of models of learning and selection. Further, recent results on coordination games
with private information are also excluded from consideration.
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conference in Paris, France, in September 2001. This is a revised version of that original paper. I
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nar participants for their insightful comments and questions. I am also grateful to Victor
Aguirregabiria, Simon Gilchrist, and Andrea Moro for many discussions on this topic. Last but not
least, the referees for this journal provided valuable suggestions for refining and clarifying the
discussion.
1. Included here would be explicit policies, such as deposit insurance, government provided guaran-
tees, numerous discussions of currency crises, and debates about the nature of aggregate fluctua-
tions that rely, in part, on fluctuations in confidence.
2. See, for example the discussion in Woodford [1987] and the comments in Aiyagari [1995] on these
points.
3. As pointed out by a reviewer, one can reject a model without being able to identify all of the
parameters.128 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
4. Of course, theorems would be preferred, but we start with examples to explore the themes.
5. Identification is vital for the design of welfare-improving interventions. However, in some cases,
we may be interested in the presence of multiple equilibria alone.
6. This structure follows Cooper and John [1988] and focuses on strategic complementarities as a
basis for multiple symmetric Nash equilibria. Of course, multiple equilibria may arise in other
games in which there are strategic substitutes, though these are not symmetric equilibria. Fur-
ther, it is understood that the multiple equilibria may also arise in fairly standard general equilib-
rium models as well as dynamic economies, such as overlapping generations models.
7. Of course, we have chosen a select set of examples for this purpose. There are many more in the
literature.
8. See Cooper [1999] for more details on conditions such that this set is nonempty.
9. In addition to being a source of multiplicity, these strategic complementarities also can magnify
and propagate shocks.
10. The sunspot process need not put positive probability on all equilibria. These restrictions may be
imposed by the researcher a priori. Further, as (X, ) vary so will the set of equilibria and Π(X, )
must adjust accordingly.
11. In the applications, we will discuss further the nature of observables to the researchers versus the
private agents. As all shocks are common and all agents are identical, there is no additional
information contained in a panel as long as the agents’ choices are part of a symmetric Nash
equilibrium. We assume for now that this is indeed the case. Carlsson and van Damme [1993]
argue that, in economies with heterogeneous agents due to incomplete information, there may be
a natural selection from the set of equilibria.
12. If, for example, the sunspot process follows a first-order Markov process, then + would include
the elements of the transition matrix characterizing the sunspot process.
13. At this point we are not precise about which moments are here. Details on that important issue
follow below.
14. Note that here we are excluding the sunspot variables from , as we are assuming there is a
unique equilibrium.
15. See the discussion and references in Gourieroux and Monfort [1996] and Hansen [1982].
16. This figure and the others that follow are taken from joint work with Jérôme Adda.
17. Note again that the domain here is θ.
18. I am grateful to Stéphane Grégoir, Simon Gilchrist, and Paul Ruud for discussions on this material.
19. Note that the method of moments does not need any such assumption.
20. See Bresnahan and Reiss [1991] for a discussion of problems with maximum likelihood estimation
in games with multiple equilibria and illustrations in an entry game.
21. Once we have a likelihood for a single observation, we can quickly generate a likelihood function
for the entire sample given that the shocks are assumed to be iid. If they are not, then the
likelihood is slightly more complicated.
22. See Bisin, Moro, and Topa [2002] for an alternative approach that puts all the weight in the
likelihood function on the most likely equilibrium and thus does not utilize an explicit sunspot
process.
23. There is also a mixed strategy equilibrium.
24. So here the unobserved variable to the researcher, but not to the private agents, is µ.
25. As these models are built around strategic complementarity, the sunspots are in the neighborhood
of the steady state. This contrasts with the conditions for sunspot equilibria in overlapping genera-
tions models, as in Azariadis [1981], as the connection to deterministic cycles, as in Azariadis and
Guesnerie [1986], is not present.
26. Further, the model could include more shocks and thus be more capable of matching other
moments.
27. As discussed below, this is sufficient to solve for a sunspot equilibrium.
28. Six parameters were estimated from seven moments: the parameters were overidentified.
29. A more recent version of that analysis introduces money growth into the model.
30. The presence of the complementarity in the stochastic growth model is of interest as a means of
propagating and magnifying shocks and also as a basis for multiplicity.
31. Of course, there is the issue of which steady state, in the event that there is more than one. In
these papers, there is generally a unique steady state. The multiplicity arises from the presence of
a continuum of paths converging to a steady state.129 STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS AND MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA
32. Kamihigashi [1996] discusses the identification in a fully specified dynamic equilibrium model.
See, in particular, Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 in that paper.
33. For the analysis of Baxter and King [1991] and Cooper and Johri [1997], the steady state was
unique and saddle path stable.
34. See Cooper and Ejarque [2000] for a stochastic growth model with intermediation shocks, and
Ingram, Kocherlakota, and Savin [1994] for maximum likelihood estimates of a stochastic growth
model including intermediation and technology shocks.
35. Whether this is the same as increasing returns at the private level, which is often found, is not
clear, since the private returns to labor is not estimated.
36. Though as discussed by Moro and Norman [2004], these arguments linking multiplicity to discrimi-
nation often exploit separability (in production, for example) across the groups of agents.
37. See Moro and Norman [2004] for a more detailed discussion of a closely related model.
38. Moro [2003] does not supply conditions for multiple equilibria. Moro and Norman [2004] supply
intuition and a formal structure.
39. Importantly, available data on human capital investment and job assignments are not used in the
estimation.
40. Akerlof [1997] presents an informal overview of this approach to social interactions.
41. It is easiest to think of x here as an indicator variable of group membership so that E(y|x) simply
measures the average value of y across the members of group x.
42. In fact, Manski makes this point even stronger with a more complex model:
yE y x E z x z =+ + ′ + ′ + () () αβ γ ηµ ,
where E(m|x, z) = x′d. The shocks (µ) may be correlated across individuals. Substituting this
equilibrium into the previous equation implies a reduced form model of:
Ey xz Ez x x z , . ()() () () ( ) [] () [] =+ ′ + ′′ −+ − − αβ γ β η β δβ η 11 1
Here it is very difficult to identify beta.
43. In the discussion of the Manski model we solved for the equilibrium values of the group means and
then substituted them back into the agent’s choice. The same issues arise in the estimation of
production functions. Using plant-level data, for example, one can use sectoral or aggregate
output as a regressor and with appropriate instruments obtain consistent estimates.
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